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This paper conceptualises foreign aid as a geopolitical form of rent in order to help 
distinguish the conditions under which aid is detrimental to sustained economic 
recovery from those where it is beneficial. Foreign aid shares with natural resource rent 
and contrived (i.e., government monopoly) rent the property of being a large revenue 
stream that is detached from the economic activity that generates it, and elicits political 
contests for its capture. Rent-driven models suggest such contests have two adverse 
effects: (i) they deflect government incentives into rent-channelling at the expense of 
promoting wealth creation; and (ii) the resulting political allocation of the rent distorts 
the economy and precipitates a growth collapse, which is protracted. In this context, the 
three principal causes of aid failure identified in the literature (corruption, a poor policy 
environment and Dutch disease effects) are all symptoms of the destabilizing impact of 
rent streams on immature political economies. Consequently, the deployment of foreign 
aid to revive collapsed economies runs the risk of perpetuating rent-seeking and thereby 
postponing essential economic restructuring. This paper compares the varied impacts of 
aid on the development trajectories of Mauritania, Kenya and Mozambique. It argues 
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that successful aid deployment requires: recognition that aid modalities differentiate 
aid’s effectiveness; stronger public accountability; and the construction of a cohesive 
pro-reform political constituency. The paper proposes a dual track strategy as a 






This paper starts from the premise that the political economy of rent extraction and 
deployment in low-income countries profoundly impacts both government incentives 
and the development trajectory. It conceptualizes foreign aid as a geopolitical form of 
rent that along with natural resource rent and contrived (government monopoly) rent is 
one of three key sources of rent in low-income countries. Natural resource rent is 
defined here as the surplus revenue from an economic activity after deducting all 
production costs, including a risk-related return on investment. It may be regarded as a 
gift from Nature, because in theory it can be taxed by governments from resource-based 
activity without impairing incentives to produce. Foreign aid has shared this unearned 
or ‘windfall’ characteristic, until the aid community became more discriminating 
through the 1990s (Collier 2006).  
The rent from natural resources in developing countries typically comprises between 
one-tenth and one-fifth of GDP (World Bank 2006a, see also Table 1). In recent decades 
the scale of geopolitical rent relative to GDP in many low-income countries has 
matched that of natural resource rent (Svensson 2000), while contrived rent (derived 
largely from government manipulation of trade policy, the exchange rate, licensing and 
credit) can be of similar magnitude (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 1992), taking the total 
rent within the economy to one-fifth to one-third of GDP, and more. The management 
of a revenue stream on such a scale, which is detached from the economic activity that 
generates it and is also fungible, would challenge the stability of even mature political 
economies. 
The economic literature suggests that a high rent/GDP ratio can facilitate economic 
development if the rent is used to boost capital formation and if the associated foreign 
exchange is deployed to enhance capacity to import the capital goods required to build a 
modern economy. But the potential economic benefits will only accrue if the rent is 
deployed effectively, i.e. by a developmental political state, which after Lal (1995) is 
one that has both sufficient autonomy to pursue a coherent economic policy and the aim 
of maximizing social welfare. In the absence of such a political state, rent is likely to 
feed patronage networks and destabilize the political economy (Collier and Hoeffler 
2006).  
Since the mid-1970s high natural resource rent in the developing economies has been 
linked with economic growth collapses (Sachs and Warner 1995). Rent-driven political 
economy models explain that high rent triggers political contests, which within 
immature political states deflect government effort into redistributing rent at the 
expense of promoting wealth creation. The resulting rent allocation locks the economy 
into a staple trap of increasing dependence upon a primary commodity with diminishing 
competitiveness. In the absence of economic reform, which powerful rent-recipients 
oppose, the economy is vulnerable to shocks and a growth collapse from which 
recovery is protracted because the preceding cumulative distortion of the economy runs 
down all forms of capital. The recent growth collapses are rooted in fashionable post-
war development theories that advocated intensified state intervention in the economy, 
but over-estimated the integrity of political states (Auty 2001). Policies to override 
markets were frequently captured by vested interests and used to boost rent-seeking in 
ways that distorted the economy, an outcome that could be sustained for longer periods 
and with larger cumulative impacts in high-rent (resource-rich) countries than in low-
rent countries (Table 1 and Figure 1).   
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Table 1  
Share of rent in GDP 1994 and per capita GDP growth, six natural resource endowment categories  
 
Pasture and 
cropland rent  Mineral rent  Total rent 
Per capita GDP 
growth 1985-97 
Resource endowment  (% GDP)  (% GDP)  (% GDP)  (%/yr) 
        
Resource poor1,2        
Large 7.34  3.22  10.56  4.7 
Small 5.41  4.45  9.86  2.4 
Resource rich         
Large 5.83  6.86  12.65  1.9 
Small, non-mineral  12.89  2.53  15.42  0.9 
Small, hard mineral  9.62  7.89  17.51  -0.4 
Small, oil exporter 2.18  19.04  21.22  -0.7 
Notes:  1   Resource-poor = 1970 cropland/head < 0.3 hectares; 
2  Large = 1970 GDP > $7 billion. 
Source:   Auty (2001: 17). 
Figure 1 
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Source:  Auty (2005: 5). 
 
Foreign aid increased sharply through the 1980s to help revive the collapsed economies. 
Although Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2005) and Karras (2006) estimate that each 
1 per cent rise in the aid/GNP ratio raises per capita GDP growth by 0.14-0.25 per cent,1 
the provision of geopolitical rent to revive collapsed resource-rich economies invariably 
                                                 
1   More specifically, Karras (2006) finds for 71 countries during 1960-97 that an increase in aid 
equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP raises the PCGDP growth rate by 0.14 to 0.26 per cent, irrespective of 
policy effects. Similarly, Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2005) report a 0.25 per cent increase in per 
capita GDP growth from a 1 per cent rise in the aid/GNP ratio for 25 Sub-Saharan African countries 
during 1970-97. However, aid must help to restructure the economy to achieve self-sustaining GDP 
growth.  
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disappointed (see Figure 1 and Svenssen 2000). The literature disputes whether the 
modest outcome is because rent feeds corruption (Boone 1996), causes political 
instability (Islam 2005) or triggers Dutch disease effects (Rajan and Subramanian 
2005). This paper argues that all three ‘causes’ are symptoms of the destabilizing 
political competition that aid triggers in immature political states as a large and fungible 
revenue rent.  
In assessing the efficiency of foreign aid during the period 1971-90, Boone (1996) finds 
that it did not increase the investment rate in recipient countries, but went mostly into 
boosting consumption and expanding the scale of government. Nor did this increased 
consumption benefit the poor in any of three different types of political state that Boone 
analysed (autocratic, egalitarian and oligarchic laissez-faire). Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) seek to refine the gloomy conclusion that the elite capture foreign aid. They 
argue that although aid has no discernible effect on countries with maladroit policies it 
has a strong positive effect on countries pursuing sound policies regarding fiscal balance 
and trade openness.  
Burnside and Dollar (2000) receive little support, however, from subsequent research 
(Hansen and Tarp 2001; Islam 2005; Rajan and Subramanian 2005). Islam (2005) finds 
that although sound policies are a necessary condition for growth, they are not sufficient 
in the absence of political stability, which is required to encourage investment. In the 
absence of political stability, aid is likely to be dissipated in unproductive consumption, 
much as Boone describes. Svensson (2000) confirms that for countries with weak 
political institutions, increases in foreign aid exacerbate corruption because much of the 
aid feeds rent-seeking activity. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) warn that aid is more likely 
to be dissipated through rent-seeking in democracies with weak political accountability 
than in autocratic political states.  
Rajan and Subramanian (2005) identify a third channel for aid’s adverse impact: they 
find that domestic expenditure of overseas aid within the public sector triggers Dutch 
disease effects that constrain labour-intensive manufacturing growth (whereas 
expenditure of private sector remittances does not).2 This finding echoes that of Bevan, 
Collier and Gunning (1987) that windfall natural resource rent is less likely to be saved 
and also invested effectively when it is concentrated on governments than when it is 
diffused across many economic agents. Similarly, Gelb and Associates (1988) demonstrate 
that the concentration of the 1974-78 and 1979-81 oil windfalls on governments led to 
over-rapid domestic absorption of the rent that triggered Dutch disease and rent-seeking, 
which depressed economy-wide investment efficiency.  
The three identified ‘causes’ of malfunctioning aid are interlinked: rents trigger contests 
that feed corruption, distort policy and cause over-rapid rent absorption (amplifying 
Dutch disease effects). This is not the case for all forms of aid, however, so the 
argument must be further nuanced: if foreign aid flows are disaggregated, some forms 
are less prone to political capture. For example, Collier (2006) finds that foreign aid 
outcomes have improved in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1980s compared with oil rent 
outcomes due to a learning curve that has directed rent into economies that demonstrate  
 
                                                 
2   Mahon (2007) also reports that remittances are deployed more effectively than aid in southern Mexico.  
 
Table 2 
Evolution of political accountability, under political states with differing autonomy and aims  
        Strength of sanction against anti-social governance 
Autonomy of state  Basic aims of state   Critical features  Rent pattern   Political accountability  Social capital  Rule of law 
       
LOW RENT INCENTIVES       
Benevolent autocratic 
nation builder 
Secure rapid GDP 
growth to sustain 
compact elite + build 
social unity  
Low rent; external 
threat; poor have low 
opportunity cost  
Low rent siphoning: 
efficient diffuse rent 
raising + dispersal 
Weak; but predation 
curbed by priority for 
social unity 
Bonding social capital 
dominant; slow 
expansion of bridging 
+ linking 
Nominal; elite 
dispense justice, at 
times arbitrarily 
       
Diffuse factional 
oligarchy 
Expand elite to deter 
policy capture and 
sustain rapid GDP 
growth  
Low rent; Intra-elite 
(land/ethnic/army) 
rivals; rapid equal 
GDP growth  
Low diffuse rent 
extraction for public 
goods + (skewed) 
wealth creation 
Moderate: growing 




autonomous linking + 
bridging social capital 
Strengthening legal 
protection; common 
law fairer > civil law 
        
Consensual factional 
democracy 
Growth then equity via 
providing basic social 
entitlements 
Low rent; middle class 
growth saps elite + 
shrinks poor  
Diffuse extraction + 
dispersal for growth > 
redistribution 
High: independent 
parliament + second 
chamber 
Autonomous linking + 
bridging social capital; 
risk of Olson effects 
Legal independence 
cuts transaction costs 
+ risk 
       
HIGH RENT INCENTIVES       
Predatory autocratic 
dictator 
Maximize elite rent 
siphoning through 
force if necessary 
High rent; violent 
predation; staple trap 
trajectory  
Point rent extraction 
by elite slows GDP 
growth 
None: power held by 
violence, which only 
elite contest 
Weak: intense elite 
rivalry; poor have 
bonding social capital  
None: elite controls by 
force; poor rely on 
custom  




captures policy to 
sustain rent + power 
High rent; unequal 
asset share; staple 
trap trajectory  
Point extraction but 
some public goods 
benefit mainly elite 
Minimal; puppet 
legislature run by 
oligarchy;  
Dependent on elite; 
repressed civic 
associations  
Skewed to favour elite 
> poor  
        
Polarized  
factional democracy 
Capture policy to 
benefit tribal clients 
even if slows long-
term GDP growth 
Democracy polarized 
on tribal lines; 
retarded GDP growth  
Rent extraction + 
skewed distribution to 
tribal clients > GDP 
growth 
Fragile: parliament 
liable to wild policy 





Judiciary subject to 
capture + biased to 
tribal clients  
Note:   Moving down the table, political accountability strengthens incrementally and endogenously under low rent (spawning developmental political states). It is retarded is the 






the capacity to use it effectively and also into applications that are subject to public 
accountability. He suggests that whereas oil rent lowers the share of government 
revenue from taxation, which is scrutinized, relative to ‘sovereign’ revenue that is not 
scrutinized, foreign aid may be subject to adequate scrutiny if it is channelled to: 
technical assistance; projects that are subjected to competitive tender; programmes 
managed by governments with proven records of effective deployment; and forgiveness 
of debt that can never be serviced. Mavrotas and Ouattara (2006) also qualify the 
differential impact of aid modalities: they report with reference to Côte d’Ivoire during 
1975-99 that increased programme aid boosts investment (that can be monitored) and 
also lowers government consumption, whereas higher project aid boosts government 
consumption (as do technical aid and food aid) but shrinks investment.  
This paper applies two rent-driven political economy models to compare the 
development trajectories of Mauritania, Kenya and Mozambique in order to distinguish 
the conditions under which geopolitical rent is detrimental to sustained economic 
recovery from those where it is beneficial. It finds that aid can reinforce the strong 
inertia of rent-seeking and retard essential economic restructuring but that the selective 
deployment of aid as part of a dual track reform strategy can improve outcomes. The 
paper proceeds by introducing rent-driven political economy models in section 2. The 
models are then applied to explain why streams of geopolitical rent have been counter-
productive in Mauritania and Kenya in sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 explains 
the mainly beneficial outcome of rent deployment in Mozambique. Section 6 sets out 
the policy implications.  
2   High-rent and low-rent political economy models  
The low-rent competitive industrialization model and the high-rent staple trap model 
demonstrate how differences in the scale of natural resource rent affect the incentives of 
the political state and the development trajectory (see Auty 2007). The competitive 
industrialization model provides a useful comparator for the high-rent staple trap model. 
It shows that low rent motivates governments to create wealth because the principal 
means of increasing revenue is through the taxation of a dynamic economy. The 
interests of the elite align with those of the majority poor in the provision of public 
goods and maintenance of efficiency incentives in order to generate wealth for the 
government to tax. These incentives yield an autocracy that is benign rather than 
predatory (Table 2); an oligarchy that is self-liquidating (as early competitive 
industrialization (described below) triggers rapid social change that proliferates 
competing interest groups able to form alliances to check policy capture by any one 
faction); and a democracy that is consensual (reflecting public satisfaction with policies 
that bring rapid socioeconomic gain). 
In contrast, high rent increases the ratio of ‘sovereign’ revenue relative to tax revenue 
and sparks political contests for its capture that deflect government effort into revenue 
distribution at the expense of promoting wealth creation, an outcome that foreign aid 
can perpetuate. Rent confers immediate (often personal) gain on governments whereas 
the benefits from wealth creation are deferred and may therefore accrue to the 
government’s successors. The high-rent incentives render an autocracy likely to be 
predatory (Table 2); whereas an oligarchy will remain concentrated (in the absence of 
rapid structural and social change); and a democracy will be polarized because the high  
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income inequality associated with resource-rich economies (explained below) polarizes 
political parties between income redistribution and the status quo, so that change in 
government brings large swings in policy that deter investment. 
Differences in rent also affect the development trajectory. The short dependence upon 
commodity exports of low-rent economies triggers industrialization at a relatively low 
per capita income, so the industry is labour-intensive and also competitive in the 
absence of rent subsidies. The resulting development trajectory (the shaded column in 
Figure 2) triggers virtuous economic and political circles. The economic circle sees early 
industrialization bring early urbanization, which accelerates passage through the 
demographic cycle so population growth slows sooner than in high-rent countries, and the 
falling dependency/worker ratio raises the share of investment in GDP relative to 
consumption. The expansion of labour-intensive manufacturing also absorbs surplus rural 
labour and encourages diversification into skill-intensive and capital-intensive 
manufacturing to boost labour productivity. In the absence of rent subsidies this 
diversification is competitive and boosts the resilience of the economy. It also 
proliferates market-oriented firms that shrink the scope for rent-seeking and maintain 
the efficiency of investment so economic growth is rapid and can double per capita 
GDP every seven to ten years.  
In addition to encouraging wealth-generation, competitive industrialization spawns a 
virtuous political circle that maintains a relatively egalitarian income distribution. This 
is because the early elimination of surplus labour puts a floor under the wages of the 
poor while the rapid expansion of skills caps the skill premium. Moreover, sustained 
rapid per capita GDP growth strengthens three sanctions against anti-social governance 
(Auty 2007) as: (i) taxation soon diversifies away from commodity exports towards 
income, profit and expenditure taxes and strengthens demands for the political 
accountability of public spending; (ii) early competitive industrialization generates self- 
Figure 2 
Low-rent and the competitive industrialization model 
Social Capital Produced Capital Natural Capital Human Capital




























Source: Auty (2007: 572).  
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Figure 3 
High rent and the staple trap model 

































help social capital that strengthens civic voice; and (iii) the proliferation of competitive 
enterprises intensifies demands for the rule of law and property rights to protect 
investment returns. These pressures yield an incremental and endogenous 
democratization as they propel the political state from a benign autocracy through a 
diffusing oligarchy to a consensual democracy (Table 2).  
In contrast, the high-rent economy’s longer dependence on rent from primary exports 
aborts competitive diversification and locks the economy into a staple trap. The 
development trajectory (the shaded column in Figure 3) skips labour-intensive 
manufacturing with three adverse consequences. First, later industrialization retards 
urbanization and delays passage through the demographic cycle so the 
dependent/worker ratio remains high and consumption continues to absorb a high share 
of GDP. Second, late manufacturing is capital-intensive so it fails to absorb surplus 
rural labour so that income inequality widens. The resultant social tensions encourage 
governments to subsidize employment by using rent to protect infant industry and over-
expand the bureaucracy. The expansion of the subsidized sector depresses the economy-
wide efficiency of capital, so that economic growth decelerates. Third, entrepreneurial 
talent is misallocated because lobbying for government favours is more remunerative 
than investing in productive activity.  
The expanding subsidized sector outstrips the rent as the relative size of the primary 
sector contracts, due to either on-going structural change or shifting terms of trade. But 
Source: Auty (2007: 573).  
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rent-seekers block economic reform so governments find it politically expedient to raise 
revenue in addition to the rent by extracting the returns to capital and labour from the 
primary sector as well as the rent. This depresses incentives in the primary sector and 
saps its viability even as the rest of the economy increases its dependence upon it. This 
staple trap trajectory of increasing dependence on a primary commodity with declining 
competitiveness renders the economy vulnerable to shocks and a growth collapse from 
which recovery is protracted. This is partly because the cumulative misallocation of 
investment causes all forms of capital to run down and partly because rent-seekers 
exhibit strong inertia by exerting their political muscle to oppose market reform because 
it shrinks their rent-extracting opportunities.  
The high-rent staple trap trajectory also weakens incentives to build sanctions against 
anti-social governance because rent recipients make fewer demands for political 
accountability than taxpayers do; social capital is dependent on state largesse, a 
condition that discourages civic voice; and entrepreneurs lobby government officials for 
favours instead of pushing for competitive markets, property rights and the rule of law. 
Tornell and Lane (1999) demonstrate that economies with powerful elites grow more 
slowly than those in which elites wield less power: in the presence of powerful groups, 
oil and coffee booms sharply increase government expenditure and debt, and also 
double the share of transfers in GDP. Where power is diffused among many groups, 
growth is faster. This is consistent with the low-rent competitive industrialization 
model, in which structural change proliferates interest groups so that autocracies and 
oligarchies self-destruct and diffuse into democracies. 
This paper argues that the provision of geopolitical rent to revive resource-rich 
economies after a growth collapse can perpetuate distortion of the political economy by 
feeding rent-seeking, easing pressure for reform and retarding economic restructuring. 
The consequences include corruption, a poor policy environment and Dutch disease 
effects. The next three sections compare the rent streams, government incentives and 
development outcomes for the three case study countries, commencing with Mauritania.  
3  Sustained high geopolitical rent and Dutch disease in Mauritania 
For three decades, Mauritania has received a rent stream of around one-third of GDP, 
mostly from geopolitical rent (Table 3). Prior to that, rent from an expanding new iron 
ore mine had triggered rapid economic growth through the 1960s. Barely 2 per cent of 
Mauritania’s one million inhabitants were urbanized then, three-quarters being herders 
scattered across one million square kilometres of arid land and one-quarter being 
farmers beside the Senegal River (Cour 2004). Mining generated two-thirds of modern 
sector income and 80 per cent of exports by 1974, when foreign aid quadrupled to one-
quarter of GNI to help Mauritania adjust to the 1973 oil shock. Aid persisted at that 
level with minor fluctuations (Table 3). Subsequently, a fishing agreement with the EU 
conferred quasi-rents that were worth 8 per cent of GDP by the early 2000s. This 
sustained, large and weakly monitored rent stream has been associated with low 
transparency in public finances; severe Dutch disease effects and a dominant rent-driven 
urban economy. These are unpropitious pre-conditions for managing an oil boom that is 
projected to generate an extra 25 per cent of GDP annually in public revenue during 
2007-16.  
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Table 3  
Foreign aid flows, 1960-2003 (Aid % GNI) 
Mauritania, Kenya and Mozambique 
   Mauritania   Kenya   Mozambique  
    
1960-64 3.1  6.4  NA 
1965-69 6.7  4.7  NA 
1970-74 10.1  3.8  NA 
1975-79 32.9  4.7  NA 
1980-84  26.9 6.8 5.8 
1985-89 24.8  8.9  26.2 
1990-94  25.0 13.6 48.4 
1995-99 22.4  5.2  32.5 
2000-2003 20.2  4.0  28.2 
Source:  World Bank (2005). 
As a consequence of IMF conditionality, Mauritania restored a nominal democracy in 
1993, after suspending it in 1978. The elite maintained power by channelling rent 
through a clientelistic system so that regime change occurred through military coups 
rather than elections. The government that ruled for two decades until May 2005 won 
three elections during 1993-2003 with over two-thirds of the vote by using public office 
to co-opt tribal leaders and fracture the opposition. The rapid rotation of office 
conferred short tenure that encouraged maximum rent siphoning, however, which some 
estimates put at one-quarter of public revenue. The elite exploited the IMF and ODA as 
sources of rent. For a decade prior to 2004, the government secretly ran off-budget 
expenditures substantially in excess of those reported to the IMF so the national 
accounts since 1995 are now being revised to determine how the economy actually 
performed. The governance indices in Table 4 are little better than those of Malawi, a 
country with one-third of Mauritania’s per capita GDP. 
In addition to feeding corruption, Mauritania’s rent-driven clientelism also engendered a 
dependent form of social capital that looked to the government and extended family for 
sustenance. It was common practice for poorer relatives to migrate from the countryside 
and expect their wealthier urban relatives to provide for them until they found a 
government job or other employment. This passive social capital contrasts with the 
resilient self-help and civic voice of the competitive industrialization model. 
Mauritania’s rent-driven economy also exhibits pronounced Dutch disease effects. The 
share of agriculture in GDP contracted after the mid-1970s’ growth collapse (Table 5), 
although stagnant per capita GDP (Table 6) would be expected to have stabilized its 
share. The IMF (2005a) estimates the share of agriculture in GDP at 16 per cent in 
2004, barely half that expected for a country at Mauritania’s level of development while 
manufacturing is two-thirds the size expected. Agriculture employs more than half the 
workforce but generates only one-sixth of GDP, half of which is subsistence. Barely 
half the herding subsector’s 12 per cent of GDP is commercialized while cropping 
exhibits even more neglect: it generates a meagre 4 per cent of GDP, one-quarter of 
which is commercial, but it employs three-quarters of the rural workforce. Yet 
Mauritania’s 150,000 irrigable hectares, if integrated with improved livestock 
management and roads to access markets, could lift agriculture’s share of GDP above 
the expected one-third level.   
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Table 4 
Index of institutional quality 2004: 









































































































































             
Malawi 667  -0.45  +0.15  -0.78 -0.58  -0.35  -0.85  -2.86 
Zambia 1,040  -0.35  +0.02  -0.94 -0.62  -0.62  -0.82  -3.33 
Kenya 1,165  -0.12  -1.16  -0.78 -0.32  -0.94  -1.01  -4.33 
Nigeria 1,183  -0.69  -1.77  -0.92 -1.01  -1.38  -1.22  -6.99 
Mozambique 1,364  -0.06  +0.04  -0.34 -0.60  -0.72  -0.68  -2.36 
Zimbabwe 2,048  -1.65  -1.58  -1.42 -2.20  -1.47  -1.24  -9.56 
Mauritania 2,228  -1.09  -0.31  -0.19 -0.14  -0.54  -0.26  -2.53 
Angola 2,425  -1.15  -0.82  -0.96 -1.24  -1.28  -1.09  -6.54 
Lesotho 2,764  +0.28  +0.31  -0.29 -0.55  -0.19  -0.15  -0.59 
Swaziland 5,137  -1.28  -0.04  -0.84 -0.44  -0.75  -0.60  -3.95 
Namibia 7,803  +0.36  +0.50  +0.09 +0.11  -0.01  +0.06  +1.11 
Botswana 10,790  +0.68  +0.94  +0.79 +0.76  +0.70  +1.10  +4.97 
South Africa  12,347  +0.82  -0.10  +0.84 +0.59  +0.19  +0.54  +2.88 
Source:   World Bank (2006b).  
Table 5 










































































           
 MAURITANIA 
           
PCGDP  (US$2,000)  206.9 239.4 298.7 330.9 348.2 310.3 311.2 339.2 366.6
Agriculture (% GDP)  43.1  31.1  31.2 29.3 31.6 29.2 28.1 25.1 20.4
Industry  24.8 38.2 35.4 30.6 24.4 29.5 30.1 30.5 30.3
  Manufacturing  NA NA NA NA NA 12.6 11.5 10.4 9.0
Services  32.0 30.7 32.7 40.1 44.0 41.2 41.8 44.3 49.3
 KENYA 
           
PCGDP  (US$2,000)  228.4 311.1 341.2 324.9 317.2 353.0 363.4 360.3 343.3
Agriculture (% GDP)  39.4  35.6  34.2 37.1 33.3 31.8 29.5 27.5 17.5
Industry  17.0 18.8 20.4 19.6 19.9 18.9 18.4 16.5 18.9
  Manufacturing  9.7 11.4 12.1 11.8 12.2 11.7 11.2 10.8 13.0
Services  43.6 45.6 45.4 43.3 46.8 49.3 52.0 56.0 63.6
 MOZAMBIQUE 
           
PCGDP  (US$2,000) NA NA NA NA  130.06 133.1 150.9 182.9  241.2
Agriculture  NA NA NA NA 34.8 44.6 32.5 35.2  26.6
Industry  NA NA NA NA 29.7 19.9 19.2 20.7  28.6
  Manufacturing  NA NA NA NA  NA NA  8.4 11.2  14.8
Services  NA NA NA NA 35.6 29.2 48.3 44.8  44.9
Source:   World Bank (2005).  
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This disappointing outcome reflects the fact that the aid-dominated rent stream eased 
pressure for politically risky economic reform until rising foreign debt necessitated IMF 
help in the 1990s.3 The resulting prolonged rural neglect denied most Mauritanians the 
opportunity to acquire the assets and skills required to take advantage of a market 
economy. In addition, their low incomes conferred not only sizable welfare losses but 
also a substantial loss of purchasing power that in the early stages of economic 
development stimulates the local supply of basic manufactured goods and services 
(Mellor 1976). Moreover, the remarkably low commercial farm output cut the sector’s 
capacity to stimulate agro-processing, which is also a key feature of early 
industrialization.  
The corollary of rural neglect is a rent-cycling urban sector, centred upon the capital 
Nouakchott, which generates three-fifths of GDP and houses one-third of the population 
(Cour 2004). Large private trading monopolies and inefficient state-owned water and 
electricity companies are permitted to skim rent from the urban economy at the expense 
of domestic private producers whose margins are shrunk by high-cost water and 
intermittent power as well as by expensive transport that reflects a haulage monopoly, 
unpaved arterial roads and the inefficiency of Nouakchott port. The monopolies also 
dominate bank credit at the expense of small private firms, whose perceived ‘high risk’ 
elicits interest rates of 20 per cent or more. Large commercial monopolies reserve 
domestic markets for imports like German dairy products and Dutch onions, even when 
local producers are cheaper. The monopolies, whether public or private, are indifferent 
to inflation and the exchange rate because they can pass costs on to their captive 
markets. If expanding oil rent is not to further distort Mauritania’s political economy 
and end in a growth collapse, safeguards proposed in section 6 must be adopted. 
4  Geopolitical rent retards Kenya’s competitive industrialization 
Failure to sustain GDP growth and thereby pass through the demographic transition 
expanded Kenya’s population six-fold during 1948-2004 and transformed Kenya from a 
resource-rich economy into a resource-poor one (World Bank 1963, 2005). The rent-
driven models predict that the resulting fall in resource rent would eventually provide 
incentives to diversify the economy into competitive manufacturing, as in Mauritius 
after it exhausted its land frontier in the 1960s. Yet although at independence in 1963 
the Kenyan economy had already developed a sizeable export-oriented manufacturing 
sector upon which to build, industrial competitiveness subsequently regressed. This 
section argues that rent from agriculture subsidized this regression and then foreign aid 
(Table 3) helped to perpetuate it.  
The Kenyan elite initially supported open trade to facilitate export production from the 
large landholdings they acquired from white settlers at independence, which policy also 
constrained rent-seeking. However in 1968 the elite amended the law in order to acquire 
urban manufacturing and importing businesses (Bates 1983), activities that were already 
major sources of contrived rent extraction elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bigsten 
1993). This triggered a drift into protectionist policies that shifted the internal terms of 
                                                 
3  When external debt was twice GDP and debt service absorbed one-quarter of export earnings (World 
Bank 2005).  
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trade in favour of manufacturing and against agriculture. By 1984, subsidies to 
manufacturing comprised 60 per cent of its value added (7 per cent of total GDP) and 
absorbed 28 per cent of the previous twenty years’ growth in farm output (Sharpley and 
Lewis 1990). The share of exports in manufacturing output regressed to 10 per cent by the 
early 1980s compared with 40 per cent in the mid-1960s. A coffee boom during 1976-79 
conferred extra rent equivalent to 8 per cent of GDP annually (Cuddington 1989), which 
the Kenyan government squeezed from farmers, leaving them with only one-third of 
world prices to cover their costs (World Bank 2003: 44). Other crops subject to state 
predation like maize and sugar also lost viability whereas less regulated crops like tea 
and horticulture did not.  
When the coffee boom faded, external debt became unsustainable and Kenya’s growth 
collapsed: the rate of per capita GDP growth, which averaged 2.8 per cent annually 
during the 1960s and 1970s, fell to 0.3 per cent during the 1980s and –0.5 per cent in 
the 1990s (Table 6). Although the growth collapse not only depressed incomes but also 
intensified pressure on natural resources, the economy still failed to diversify into 
competitive manufacturing (Table 5) because rent-seekers undermined governance and 
derailed IMF-backed trade liberalization efforts (Table 4). Increased aid facilitated rent-
seeking by allowing the successor to Kenya’s founding president (who died in 1978) to 
play off the dominant tribes against each other and maintain a political coalition of smaller 
tribes in the western rift valley (Ndegwa 2003). The new leader shored up his coalition by 
drawing on geopolitical rent, which more than doubled to 11.4 per cent of GNI annually 
during 1986-95, peaking at 13.6 per cent in the early-1990s (Table 3). The aid was 
inadequately targeted and officials and businessmen extracted rent through scams, 
including one that recycled four hundred million dollars through fictitious mineral 
exports (Economist 2006). Aid did raise per capita GDP slightly but it was also 
associated with Dutch disease effects that halved agriculture’s share of GDP (Table 5). 
Donors eventually responded in the 1990s by cutting aid to 4 per cent of GNI, causing 
incomes to fall, but the government was still re-elected in 1997, albeit with barely two-
fifths of the vote, courtesy of a fractured opposition. 
The cumulative welfare loss from postponed economic restructuring has been 
considerable: Kenya’s mean per capita GDP growth rate during 1960-2000 of 1.5 per 
cent is 3.5 per cent slower than the high-performing Asian economies although Kenya’s 
lower per capita income implies its underlying growth potential was 1.5 per cent higher 
than the Asian economies (World Bank 2003: 29). Although the ruling party finally lost 
power in 2002 to a fifteen-party coalition that captured two-thirds of the vote, the 
welfare losses are likely to persist because rent-seeking exhibits strong inertia. When 
donors expanded aid to encourage economic reform the new government muted its 
attacks on corruption and reverted to rent-seeking to balance factions within its diverse 
coalition, as some observers had predicted (Ndegwa 2003).  
5  Targeting geopolitical rent on wealth creation in Mozambique 
In contrast to Mauritania and Kenya, geopolitical rent in Mozambique has been 
relatively successful. Efforts to restructure the Mozambique economy after it had been 
distorted by a failed experiment with central planning and years of civil strife, attracted 
unusually high flows of foreign aid, which averaged 42.4 per cent of GNI annually 
during 1987-2003 (Table 3). Aid lifted Mozambique’s investment rate to more than  
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double the expected level, at almost 50 per cent of GDP, and expanded import capacity, 
removing a severe constraint on growth (de Sousa and Sulemane 2003). The rent stream 
triggered a strong economic recovery from the mid-1990s after resurgent civil strife 
ended (Table 5). It is also associated with a revival of democracy and creditably high 
indices of governance for a country with Mozambique’s per capita income (Table 4). 
These favourable outcomes appear to reflect the scrutiny of public expenditure by a 
credible political opposition and also donor preference for financing import-intensive 
investment that it could monitor. 
The restoration of democracy produced two relatively evenly matched political parties 
that drew support from the rival contestants in the civil war, so unlike Mauritania and 
Kenya the opposition was not fragmented and initially at least presented a credible 
threat to the ruling party. In addition, donors targeted aid at investment, which they 
could more effectively monitor than general budget support or current consumption. 
The investment drew on surplus domestic labour and was import-intensive. Adam and 
Bevan (2003) find with reference to Uganda that aid directed at import-rich 
infrastructure, which boosts the productivity of private sector activity, limits Dutch 
disease effects.  
Targeted aid within a contested polity may also help to explain why Mozambique’s 
stabilization policy succeeded in the late  1990s. Successful stabilization, boosted by 
generous tax exemptions, elicited a large inflow of FDI into capital-intensive projects, 
notably a US$2.2 billion aluminium smelter. The inflow renewed fears of Dutch disease 
that proved unfounded and during the construction phase 1999-2003 the real exchange 
rate actually fell from 76 per cent of its 1990 value to 60 per cent (IMF 2003: 27). But 
the foreign investment created few long-term jobs and boosted urban growth, mostly in 
the far south of the country. Although agriculture sustains 80 per cent of the workforce 
and grew at 6.6 per cent annually during 1996-2004, its share of GDP declined as heavy 
industry and tourism grew faster (IMF 2005b: 7). Nevertheless, the rate of rural poverty 
fell from 71 per cent in 1996 to 55 per cent in 2003, paralleling the national drop, which 
the IMF (2005b: 12-13) attributes to rapid GDP growth, some gain in market access for 
farmers and also broad-based advances in education and health.  
Adams and Bevan (2003) warn, however, that aid targeted at infrastructure amplifies 
income inequality because it benefits urban households more than rural households. The 
resumption of rapid per capita GDP growth in Mozambique did not boost domestic 
consumption proportionately. This is partly because the withdrawal of geopolitical rent 
channelled much of the extra output into debt service and exports rather than into 
consumption (Personal communication, A. Gelb 2003). But it also reflects a long-
standing urban policy bias that retards economic restructuring. Central planning had 
initially stressed heavy industry and large-scale agriculture at the expense of peasant 
farming and even before the FDI inflow, agriculture generated 8 per cent less GDP than 
expected for an economy at Mozambique’s level of development, whereas industry 
produced 9 per cent more than expected (Tarp et al. 2002: 12). As in Mauritania, many 
farmers in Mozambique lacked market access and so could not take advantage of 
economic improvements. Although the fraction of smallholders engaging in markets 
doubled during 1996-2005, the ratio remained at barely one-quarter (IMF 2005b: 12).   
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Farmers need all-weather tertiary roads if they are to emerge from subsistence 
production and capture the productivity and environmental gains from crop 
specialization (Tiffin and Mortimore 1994).4 Yet government and donors in 
Mozambique concentrated transport investment on primary roads (Tarp et al. 2002: 
108), which bridge space between cities, rather than open it up for development. Despite 
the strong aid-led rebound, 60 per cent of Mozambique’s population remain illiterate, 
one-third lack access to health care and one-eighth are HIV positive. Moreover, as with 
other regional aid recipients like Uganda and Rwanda (IMF 2005b: 34), weak tax 
enforcement leaves Mozambique taxation at 12.5 per cent of GDP, half the target level. 
Unfortunately, Mozambique government officials increasingly rely on aid to substitute 
for domestic public revenue, which they siphon away for personal gain (Hanlon 2004). 
The country’s graft index deteriorated from -0.47 to -0.68 during 2002-04, although 
rising incomes should have brought improvement (World Bank 2006b). The 
consolidation of aid within the overall budget risks feeding this constituency rather than 
strengthening overall policy coherence, as intended.  
As aid and donor influence wane, sustained development in Mozambique requires the 
mainly rural electorate to cohere in resisting policy capture by emerging urban rent-
seeking interests. Fortunately, the economic case for supporting the rural economy is 
strong: an IFPRI simulation finds that as aid shrinks the strongest growth potential lies 
in agriculture because it is less adversely affected by the resulting cuts in public 
investment and import compression than either construction or urban services (Tarp et 
al. 2002: 76-85). The IMF (2005b: 16) concurs, stressing the need to promote labour-
intensive growth and encourage new business formation.  
6 Conclusions 
The scale of natural resource and geopolitical rent in low-income countries is large in 
aggregate, ranging in recent decades from 20-33 per cent of GDP and more. Rent is 
detached from the activity that generates it and on this scale has strong potential to 
destabilize the political economy in immature political systems. The numerous growth 
collapses in resource-rich developing countries during 1974-85 reflect this process 
(Figure 1). They stem from fashionable policies to override markets through the 1950s 
and 1960s that inadvertently increased the risk that rent-seeking groups would capture 
natural resource rent and contrived rent to the detriment of sustained long-term wealth 
creation. The higher the rent the longer that maladroit rent deployment continued and 
the greater the distortion of the political economy. The provision of foreign aid to 
restructure collapsed economies risks perpetuating this distortion of the political 
economy if it merely provides a stream of geopolitical rent.  
Kenya dramatically shows how such growth collapses retard the demographic transition 
and accelerate the shift towards resource scarcity. But although rent-driven models 
predict this condition will self-correct by motivating governments to create wealth and 
by shifting the development trajectory into competitive industrialization, this did not 
occur in either Kenya or Mauritania. The reason appears to be that rent-seekers treat aid 
                                                 
4   In Mozambique, the penalty arising from high marketing costs ranges from 25 per cent of revenue for 
maize to 80 per cent for cassava and other basic food crops (Tarp et al. 2002).  
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as additional rent. They undermine reform to restructure of the economy and promote 
political accountability because they prosper from a distorted economy and lose if 
competitive markets expand.  
The inertia of rent-seeking means that the provision of foreign aid to distorted 
economies can perpetuate all three adverse aid features that the literature has identified 
(corruption, poor policy and Dutch disease effects) in the presence weak sanctions 
against anti-social governance and of a fractious society. The Mozambique case 
suggests, however, that geopolitical rent can be beneficial where: (i) donors target 
investment (rather than current consumption and/or budgetary support, which are more 
fungible) and monitor it and also encourage  institutions for transparent macro policy 
and public finances; and (ii) a credible pro-reform political opposition coheres to hold 
the government to account. In Mozambique the risk of renewed civil strife may have 
reinforced the democratic check on the government, at least initially.  
Rajan and Zingales (2006) warn that institutional reform may not be sufficient to 
achieve development-enhancing change in the absence of supportive political 
constituencies. Consequently, the political economy should inform reform policies and 
reformers should ensure they build political constituencies to back such policies. A 
critical implication of the damaging inertia of rent-seeking is the utility of a dual track 
development strategy (which successful economies as varied as China, Malaysia, 
Mauritius and the UAE have pursued). The dual track strategy weans as fast as is 
feasible an increasing fraction of the economy off patronage-channelled rent distribution 
and into market-guided wealth creation. Track one creates a dynamic market economy 
that inflicts minimal immediate costs on the elite. In creating a dynamic market, track 
one also builds an increasingly powerful political lobby in favour of economy-wide 
reform. Meanwhile, track two promotes reform of the rent-driven (usually urban) 
economy, but slowly, in recognition of the political risk to the survival of reforming 
governments if they tackle vested interests head-on. In all three case studies analysed 
here, a dual track strategy would strengthen the large rural constituency that has much 
to contribute to early economic development, not least as a political check on urban 
rent-seeking, but it can do so only if ethnic factionalism does not fragment the rural 
vote. 
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